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Managing Rapid Change:
From Theory to Practice
An Invited Article

J. Michael

The following includes an
interview with James M. Guinan.
Mr. Guinan began his career in
retailing in 1958 with R. j. Macy,
Inc. He then moved to Federated
Department Stores where he held
such diverse positions as division
president, chair, and CEO. After
serving as president of the
Bloomingdale's stores, he became
CEO of Caldor and, subsequently,
became CEO of Consolidated
Stores, USA. Mr. Guinan is now
retired.
Organizational "change," from a
theoretical perspective, is defined
as a difference in the form,
quality, or condition of an
organization over time (Van de
Ven & Poole, 1995). From a
very practical perspective,
organizational change can be
defined as a demanding, difficult
process requiring adaptation and
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effort. For example, IBM was
one of the most profitable
companies in the world from
1950 until 1990 yet lost more
than $10 billion between 1991
and 1993. Huge, rapid changes
were required at IBM and,
eventually, more than 170,000
people lost their jobs before the
company stabilized.
Theoretical Perspectives
According to most strategic
experts, an organization must
continuously reinvent itself in
order to maintain a sustainable
competitive advantage that will
withstand the forces of
competition (Porter, 1985). In
recent years, the competitive
forces driving changes
throughout industry have
included globalization,
technology, regulations and laws,
economic trends, and workforce
diversity. Developments in
technology, in particular, have
been the driving force behind
organizational change.
Innovation streams and rapidly
increasing technology cycles have
dictated change that is both
discontinuous and requisite for
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survival {Tushman, Anderson, &
O'Reilly, 1997). Recent
experiences with e-commerce and
the Internet have forced
companies to engage in a
continuous process of evolution
that some academics have
defined as Darwinian in nature.
"Survival of the fittest" has been
literally translated in terms of
practice as "adapt or die" (Vaill,
1989).
Practical Perspectives
The sheer volume and intensity
of global competition and
technological innovation have
forced most businesses to
continuously change. During the
past decade, the study of the
change process has been a major
focus of academics. One of the
most useful approaches to
change management has been
termed "results driven change"
(Schaffer & Thomson, 1992).
Results driven change is designed
to create change quickly by
focusing on the measurement and
improvement of results. A
number of field studies
demonstrate the practicality of
this results-driven approach.
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Reflective of this philosophy is
the following interview with
James M. Guinan, a retired CEO
in the retail industry.

One Practitioner's Views:
An Interview with
James M. Guinan'
How would you describe your role
in your past few assignments?
As chief executive officer/chief
operating officer, my task was to
take an underperforming
company in-hand, install quick
fixes, and develop longer-term
cures. In general, my goal was
to provide for near- and longterm profitability at levels well
beyond those that were presently
being achieved. My first
turnaround was with the Gold
Circle Division of Federated
Department Stores. Then, in
successive order, I went to
Bloomingdale's, Caldor, and
Consolidated.
In one sense, you could call me a
retailing turnaround specialist.
My approach differed markedly,
however, from some of the
financial turnaround specialists
who were so prevalent on the
retailing scene in the past
decade. Having been in "blue
chip" retailing {Macy's,
Federated, and Associated Dry
Goods) for over 30 years, I was
cognizant of, and comfortable
with, the complex dynamics that
help and hurt profitability in the
various aspects of the business.
As a result, I could intelligently
cut expenses, allocate resources,
and shape priorities with
minimum waste, error, and
trauma. This is where my
approach contrasted sharply with
the tactics of the financially
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driven turnaround specialists
who were great at achieving
short-term returns for stockholders or creditors. The "slash
and bum" tactics of these
specialists often left companies
weak in talent, resources, and
direction.

What did you learn about the
strategic management of change?
I learned that while the problems
causing poor profitability at the
various companies I managed
were very different, the solution
matrices were remarkably the
same except in finer details. In
rather oversimplified form, the
solution matrix went something
like this:
(1) Before I took on any role of
new CEO, I would always
bargain for, and receive, a
commitment from the Board
and major players (e.g.,
creditors) that "all other
cooks had to get out of my
new kitchen!"
(2) During the first month, I
would sell myself to the
executive group (the top 30
or so). Since my reputation
(fortunately, essentially
positive) always preceded
me, it was moderately easy
to convince a new group that
(a) they were now working
for a tough, knowledgeable,
fair-minded executive, and
(b) they need not fear
anything from anyone but
me. This selling of myself
would take place in the first
ten days of a new tenure. I
used mass meetings, group
meetings, and one-on-one
sessions. When I wasn't
involved in these activities, I
would be out in the field,
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absorbing as much of the
reality of the company and
its employees as I could.
(3) Within the same time period,
I would introduce into the
company three to six
executives who had worked
for me at other companies.
They aided my transition by
reaffirming and fleshing out
aspects of my personality,
credibility, and philosophy.
This was done informally and
without my direction. I was
also very careful to install
these executives in new jobs
or vacant jobs so as to not
have them viewed as
interlopers.
(4) During the second month,
the top executive group and I
would forge the company's
mission statement. This
document of one, or at most
two, pages stated who we are
in the marketplace, where we
want to be in the short and
longer terms, and how, in the
broad strategic sense, we
planned to get there. Once
agreement was reached on
the mission statement, each
pyramid head would be given
two weeks to construct a
game plan to attain the
mission statement. Each
plan was expected to be
significantly specific, at least
as to close-in (two-to-three)
years, and was required to be
no more than ten typed
pages. All pyramid heads
shared their plans. Much
discussion would ensue.
Finally, the entire executive
group, including me, would
sign off on the ten-page plans
as the tactical accompaniment
to the two-page strategic
plan. To establish a "new
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vision" for the company, we
would all actually sign the
mission statement in a ceremonial manner. Reproduction
of it (without supportive
data) would then be placed
in the hands of all staff
employees and displayed in
all employee work areas.
This was intended to show
direction and unanimity.
(5) The next phase would begin
somewhere around the third
month. This was usually a
brutal month. I would drop
all "negative shoes" at once
in order to get them over
with. During this month, I
would terminate the two-tofive top executives who had
to go. I went to great
lengths to do this with
humanity and attention to
dignity. These executives
were then replaced as rapidly
as possible with a mixture of
promotions and new hires.
Within this timeframe, the
executive group and I would
cut deeply into the fat of
expenses. (There was always
fat.) We would then allocate
both expense and capital for
the coming fiscal year. We
never took actions that
would seem to refute or
hinder the game plan just
approved.
(6) Finally, with all of these
actions either underway or in
place, my new team and I
would settle down to the
hard work (and fun) of
running our increasingly
profitable company. I never
encouraged a sense of shrill
urgency. Rather, I stressed
an atmosphere of
professional, informed
competence and teamwork.
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This was always done with
time for family, appropriate
relaxation, and quiet
celebration for each goal
won.

What were some of the typical
obstacles to change that you
faced, and how were you able to
overcome them?
Presuming no crippling
impediments to adequate funding
and capitalization, all obstacles
to change are human. These
human obstacles are divided into
those you work for and those
who work for you. First, the
former ... when entering any
new rapid change situation, I
always established strong and
ongoing communications with my
Board or corporate office. At my
very first meeting with them
(always before starting in the
job), I would again remind them
that I, alone, was running the
company and that, while I would
report to them, I would brook no
operational interference from
them unless they wished to fire
me. I would also establish with
them a firm date, usually one
month, at which time I would
report back to them on my game
plan in great detail. I would
hold to that date. At this first
game plan meeting, I would try
to obtain consensus on the broad
details and on my capital
spending plans. This was critical
since I very often had to spend
money to make money. I would
then meet with them as often as
they wanted, usually once a
month in the beginning and less
frequently as the game plan
began to take hold. I would also
share with them the mission
statement and supportive data
since, to a large degree, that was
our game plan. Both at the
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onset and later on, I would resist
any attempt on their part to
micro-manage. I was always
amenable to discussing with
them the big picture and the
bigger strategies. Fortunately,
my activities almost always
yielded the expected results, so
the pressure and obstacles from
this group usually faded away by
late in the first year and
remained, thereafter, at the
passive information level.
As for obstacles to change from
my new employees, such
obstacles come from fear,
ignorance, or the protection of
turf. My game plan for overcoming such resistance is pretty
well described above. Most of it
went away (or the individuals
did) early in the game plan. In
one case, I found an organization
with unusual resistance to
change. For some months, we
had considerable guerrilla
warfare, with the guerrillas
winning, until I understood the
dynamics of the executive mix.
What it took me a while to
realize was (a) that I faced a
longer-term layer of incumbents
who had grown up in the
business, to its present size, but
who had, in turn, become superannuated by their very success;
and (b) that another layer of
incumbents had been installed by
an unsuccessful predecessor.
The second layer consisted of
executives who understood the
modern business world somewhat better than those in the
first layer, but the second-layer
executives were also inadequate
for the challenge. Layer two
executives hated, and were hated,
by layer one executives. I
inadvertently compounded the
problem by layering on
executives of my own, which
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resulted in a three-layer dynamic
that resembled tribal warfare in
its complexity, hatreds, and
paralysis! The solution, once I
understood it, was deep and
broad surgery-again, done as
quickly as possible . This was
followed by some psychologistdirected "we-are-family"
sessions. Finally, after some oldfashioned head knocking, it was
time to get to work.

What advice would you give an
executive who senses that major
and rapid change is called for?
First, a personal bias, in most
situations, an incumbent CEO
who senses the need for rapid
change is probably the one who
brought on the crisis through
action or inaction. That person,
I believe, should be the first to
go. The greatest dilemma faced
by an IBM, a Saks, or a General
Motors is that the top four layers
of executives have caused the
problems. They are entrenched
in the wrong philosophies. Only
with a fresh perspective from the
outside can major changes really
get underway. 1 would
recommend the following to a
good incumbent who is faced
with technological, marketing, or
some other changes that could
not have reasonably been
anticipated. Privately, pretend
that it is Day One on a new job,
take a week, and step out of the
operational loop. Assess the
problems and the probable
solutions with as little emotional
baggage as possible. Proceed
from there with a tailored
version of the game plan 1
previously described.

What do you think really causes
large organizations to change in a
successful manner?
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Only one thing: a CEO who
makes the change participatory,
coherent, mandatory, and
desirable.

What maintains the changes ...
What keeps the changes from
regressing/not working?
That's a very good question since
the mere introduction of change
does not guarantee survival for
any significant length of time.
One personal case in point: in
the mid-1960s, I was a very
junior vice president at a
Midwest department store that
was then struggling with significant expense and profitability
problems. The CEO was a very
good man but more of a marketer
than a generalist. One day, he
announced that he was bringing
in a nationally-known firm of
efficiency experts to "help" with
the expense problems. Several
weeks later, "they" arrived-half
a dozen very bright, humorless
young men, each with vest,
clipboard, and stopwatch. For
two weeks, they watched us
order goods, run stores, load
trucks, clean mirrors, and do all
the myriad, diverse tasks
required to run a department
store group. At the end of the
period, they " installed" their
system changes \vith the elated
backing of our CEO. They then
claimed an annual expense
reduction for the changes of
several million dollars in return
for their one-time fee of some
$300,000-a very reasonable
trade-off on paper. Unfortunately,
their installation required
orchestrations of human behavior
that depended on precision and
change well beyond reasonableness, particularly on an ongoing
basis. Very quickly, the installations started to disappear. No
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one meant to plot against them;
but rather like large boulders on
the surface of a bog, they
disappeared over a fairly short
timespan and then were quickly
gone and forgotten.
Maintaining and, in fact,
building on desirable change
requires that the change be in
the very bones of the executive
organization. It should be their
change. It should be perceived
by them as right, do-able, and
intrinsic to the warp and woof of
not just the company's well-being
but also the executives' wellbeing. At the point that change
has come about this way and is
maintained this way, the CEO
can step back somewhat from
being the prime mover of early
change and spend more time on
forward strategic planning,
marketing, capital utilization, etc.
The executive organization will
maintain and defend the
changes, "their" changes.

What do you see as the personal
characteristics of executives who
have successfully managed rapid
change?
First, let's define "successfully."
The deeper the fiscal crisis in a
given company (bankruptcy or
near bankruptcy, for example),
the more short-term results are
both necessary and desirable. I
would not, however, characterize
as a successfully managed change
any such effort that left an
otherwise viable company in a
stripped and barren condition. It
would be better to liquidate such
a company than leave it limping
for the hyenas, as it were. My
definition of successfully
managed rapid change, therefore,
would be any change that helps a
company (a) survive in the near
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tenn so that it can (b) regroup
and regain its health in the midterm and, thus, (c) begin to
flower toward its full potential
further down the road.
For this continuum of survival,
nurturing, and flowering, a
company needs a CEO who must
(1) be a natural, readily accepted

leader;
(2) possess unshakable self-

confidence (the most
important attribute in getting
things done);
(3) understand fully the fine art
of weaving continually in
many arenas between a toolight or too-heavy
management touch; and
(4) exude a basic quality of quiet
toughness that never needs
to be reinforced by displays
of ego, temper tantrums, or
the putting down of
subordinates either in public
or private (such displays are
signs of personal fear and
weakness and are very
counterproductive).
The CEO who successfully
manages rapid change will
(1) exhibit a tolerance for
mistakes-even big ones-if
made for good reasons;
(2) project a personality that
makes it all interesting,
challenging, heady fun-even
well before the results come
rolling in-as long as
progress is being made; and
(3) discreetly cope with selfdoubt and "3 a.m. nerves"
(these are the times that
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require intelligence and
introspection, as such doubts
must always be kept private).

If you had it to do again, would
you have done things differently in
any of your change efforts?
A difficult question ... particularly since I have always viewed
such complex and holistic efforts
in tenns of completed football
games: on the thirteenth play
from scrimmage, should I have
called an off-tackle run instead of
the disastrous screen pass? In
hindsight, most definitely; but as
one continues to learn, it becomes
just as important to think, "don't
talk about plays-how did we
play the game?"
In retrospect, however, I was
sometimes slow to see things
about the senior executives who
followed me from one turnaround
situation to another. I may have
regarded them too highly for their
efforts in the turnaround process.
The result was needless trauma
for both parties when one was
slowing down or had topped out.
Even now, I'm not sure how to
handle this since it's difficult to
take a horse out of the race until
he actually stumbles.

What is the most important lesson
to be learned in facing up to rapid
change management?
View the impending change as
though it were a large, complex
military campaign. Plan as
quickly as possible but take
enough time to think out all major
contingencies and reactions.
Move rapidly and thoroughly after
all planning is in place and all
immediate subordinates are
signed on. Err, if necessary, on
the side of "too much, too soon"
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since the penalties for that
course of action are never as
severe as "too little, too late."
Dragging things out w ill defeat
or at least dilute, most positive'
actions.

How did you learn this lesson?
Can it be taught? How would
you teach it?
Rapid change management is
really no different than ongoing
management except the time is
compressed, crises are magnified,
and the penalties for wrong
action or inaction are most
severe in the short term. In my
case, learning took place on the
job, both at the department level
and at the pyramid head level
where crisis management would
occasionally occur in microcosm.
I honed my skills first, as a
specialist then as a generalist, a
course of action that stood me in
good stead as my responsibilities
expanded .
Notice that I said "honed" not
learned. While some of the craft
of management and crisis
management can be taught,
many aspects of it cannot, such
as strong nerves and ego strength
(not ego needs), the ability to
think under pressure in fluid
situations, the charisma of
leadership, a facility for numbers,
a facility for people and people
interactions, and the ability to
see the whole picture-present
and future, each simultaneously
with their parts. In any event, I
don't see these aspects of crisis
management being taught,
particularly not by the case
method study that deals so
heavily with marketing decisions
and end results instead of the
minutiae of how to get there.
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How would I teach it? Othe r
than on the job, perhaps as an
honors course or coursesprobably at the MBA level with
no less than two years of
management experience as a
prerequisite-choosing only those
students who possess at least the
nascent natural skills of a crisis
manager as outlined above.
Expose them in detail to real-life,
crisis managers and spend a
great deal of time on crisis
management case studies. Each
case study would have to be as
complex and ambiguous as real
life, with enough shifting and
emerging as to involve the
students in one case for many
months. Perhaps several teams,
kept totally separate, could work
on the same crisis management
case study at the same time.
If the branching of results from
micro-decisions were
sophisticated enough, the two
very disparate final products
would be an education in
themselves.
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Did you enjoy crisis management?
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